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CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT
would only be leaving to Congress the legislative task of
asserting clearly when national regulations exclude state
controls, and also when state controls have intruded where
Congress feels uniform freedom from control is required.
However, until some clearer pronouncement from Con-
gress, or the Court, occurs, the difficulty of choosing the
applicable test from outstanding majority opinions so as
to predict the validity of any future state regulation is illus-
trated by the generality of the conclusion recently drawn
by Professor Thomas Reed Powell, ". . . that one might
safely say that the states may regulate commerce some,
but not too much"."'
The Maryland Version Of The Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act, With Special Reference To
The Writ Of Habeas Corpus'
Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act is an attempt to limit the ever-increasing
case load of the Court of Appeals by reducing the number
of appeals arising from repeated collateral attacks on crim-
inal convictions. At the same time it attempts to preserve,
within clearly defined limits, appellate review for persons
who are allegedly illegally imprisoned.2 The Maryland
Act is substantially the same as the Uniform Post Convic-
tion Procedure Act.' There is, however, one important
difference. The Uniform Act applies to all collateral pro-
ceedings to test the legality of incarceration both in lower
(1952); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The repudiation of a
jurisprudence of formulas in the above cases, as in the area with respect
to the extent of the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause (see
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-124 (1942) would indicate the ultimate
weakness in this area of the "direct burden" nomenclature.
61 POWVLL, VAGARIES AND VARIMIIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRELTATION
(1956) 178. Professor Powell, after voicing the cited conclusion, then said:
"Once I asked Mr. Justice Holmes why counsel should not give up
prating about national and local, uniformity and diversity, and tell
the court that the law is free for a decision either way, and then add:
'I propose to confine myself to practical consideration why my way Is
wiser than my opponent's way.' He remarked: 'I wish to God they
would'." Ibid.
13 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1958) Art. 27, §§645 A-645 J, as amended by
MD. LAWS 1959, Ch. 429, effective June 1, 1959, hereinafter referred to as
"The Act". All references are to the Act as amended.
2 The Act accomplishes more than merely discouraging repetitious and
frivolous claims for relief; in general It sets forth a more orderly and
workable procedure than has heretofore been available in Maryland.
a9B UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED (1957) 352, §§1-14. According to the
annotations as of July, 1959, one other state, Arkansas, had adopted this
Uniform Act. AmK. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1957) Art. 43, §§3101-3110.
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and appellate courts.4 Under the Maryland Act, all post
conviction proceedings, including petitions based on
grounds heretofore only available under the writ of habeas
corpus, may be brought in the lower court and are subject
to appeal.' However, the writ of habeas corpus may also
be brought outside the provisions of the Act, although if
this is done, there is no right of appeal.'
The Act is available to "[a]ny person convicted of a
crime and incarcerated under sentence of death or imprison-
ment,....-7 It expressly applies to proceedings brought by
defective delinquents under Article 31 Bs and persons con-
fined as a result of convictions by a trial magistrate, includ-
ing a magistrate of the Traffic Court of Baltimore City.9
Only those cases come under the Act in which the
legality of petitioner's incarceration is subject to collateral
attack upon grounds ".... heretofore available under a writ
of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common
law or statutory remedy . , While both the writ of
'Supra, n. 3, §1.
'The Act, §645 A(a), 645 I. Though the Maryland Act does not ex-
pressly state that a post conviction proceeding other than habeas corpus
(such as coram nobis, infra, ns. 12-13) must follow the provisions of the
Act in a lower court proceeding, the exceptional express treatment of the
writ of habeas corpus hereafter discussed suggests such a conclusion.
Because of Maryland's treatment of the writ of habeas corpus, its char-
acterization of the Act as a Uniform Act should be viewed with caution.
The Act, §645 J.
6The Act, §645 A(b). The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 4 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 42 Is unaffected by the Act eawcept that Art.
42, §6 formerly allowing petitioner to request leave to appeal is now re-
pealed by MD. LAWS 1958, Ch. 45, §1. Thus the new Act is the sole route
for appeals to the Court of Appeals. The Article 42 writ of habeas corpus
has come full circle and now is substantially identical to its common law
form. See Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 44 A. 2d 807 (1945).
7The Act, §645 A(a). The Uniform Act is limited to felons. Supra, n.
3, §1.
"The Act, §645 A(a). 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 31 B, §10. It follows that
persons who are not imprisoned criminals nor defective delinquents cannot
avail themselves of the Act. It should be noted that the writ of habeas
corpus in Maryland applies to: "Any person, committed, detained, confined
or restrained from his lawful liberty within this State for any alleged
offense or under any color or pretense whatsoever ........ [Emphasis
added]. 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 42, §3. While the limits of this latter
class are not defined by Maryland law, persons within this class have never
had appellate rights. Thus, for example, criminally insane and insane
persons under confinement by 5 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 59, §§8, 20, had and
still have a less complete remedy under the writ of habeas corpus than
convicted criminals. Miller v. Superintendent, 190 Md. 741, 60 A. 2d 189
(1947) ; Hoey v. Superintendent, 212 Md. 636, 129 A. 2d 63 (1957) ; Lutz
v. Superintendent, 203 Md. 675, 100 A. 2d 732 (1953).
"The Act, §645 A(a).
"The Act, §645 A(a). Post conviction procedures are concerned with
the legality of incarceration and not with the guilt or Innocence of the
person imprisoned. The Act, §645 A(a) sets out the possible grounds for
relief :
"... that the sentence or judgment was Imposed In violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this
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habeas corpus" and the writ of coram nobis 12 are recog-
nized in Maryland,13 the remainder of this note for the
most part treats the effect of the Act upon habeas corpus
situations since: habeas corpus is the broader writ in Mary-
land, both in scope and use; (b) the history of the right
to appeal in habeas corpus cases discloses both the neces-
sity for and the purposes of the present Act; and (c) lastly,
the Act has a more complex effect upon the writ of habeas
corpus than upon other possible post conviction remedies.
In Maryland there was no common law right of appeal
from habeas corpus proceedings. 4 The Maryland Consti-
tution's guaranty of the writ does not require that the writ
be extended beyond its common law limits. 5 However,
some form of appellate review is desirable since it more
fully protects the rights of the immediately concerned
persons and at the same time creates a consistent body of
substantive appellate law. 6 The Act of 1945 for the first
time gave an applicant for the writ of habeas corpus a
right of appeal." In 1947 the Legislature unsuccessfully
attempted to lighten the resulting case load of the Court of
Appeals by substituting an application for leave to appeal
in lieu of a direct appeal." However, the appellate remedy
State, or that the court or !trial magistrate, including a Magistrate
of the Traffic Court of Baltimore City, was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum au-
thorized by law, or that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack . .. ."
The Act in no way affects original trial court proceedings or any direct
appellate review of sentence or conviction. This section was applied in,
In Re: Homesic Pride, The Daily Record, March 9, 1959 (Md. 1959).
114 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 42. For the purposes of this article the writ
of habeas corpus and related procedure under Art. 42 will be referred
to as the "common law writ of habeas corpus" as distinguished from pro-
ceedings under the Act.
12 Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 166 A. 410 (1933) ; Bernard v. State, 193
Md. 1, 65 A. 2d 297 (1949).
11 For excellent discussions of the scope and substantive law of these
writs see, Bernard v. State, ibid.; 9B UNIrORm LAws ANNOTATED (1957)
345-351; Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus
and by Appeal, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154 (1953)..
"Bell v. The State Use of Miller, 4 Gill 301 (Md. 1846) ; Ex-parte
Coston, 23 Md. 271 (1865).
"MD. CONST. Art. III, §55; Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 44 A. 2d
807 (1945); NiLEs, MARYLAND CONsTITuTIoNAL LAW (1915) 215. That a
state's denial of appeal in any criminal proceeding is not a denial of due
process under the 14th Amendment, see, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
(1894) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), conc. op. 20, 21.
16 Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and
by Appeal, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1162-1163 (1953).
"MD. LAws 1945, Ch. 702, §3C; McElroy v. Director, 211 Md. 385, 389, 127
A. 2d 380 (1956).
84 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 42, §6; McElroy v. Director, ibid. The attempt
failed because MD. CONST. Art. IV, §15, requires that ". . . in every case
an opinion, In writing, shall be filed." The amount of appellate consid-
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has not only offered protection to persons allegedly un-
lawfully confined; it has also clogged the Court of Appeals
with unfounded claims for relief.'" The present Act at-
tempts to limit a petitioner to one appeal.
The Act does not abolish the common law petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.2" Instead, it sets up an alternative
procedure under which applications for writs of habeas
corpus may be treated either as they were prior to 1945
or as a proceeding under the Act.2' The applicant must
consent before the latter procedure can be adopted.22 If
there is such consent, or the applicant proceeds originally
under the Act, the case will be heard in the court where
the conviction took place.23 If the applicant refuses such
eration and action was the same whether the court denied an appeal
or a petition for leave to appeal. Markell, supra, n. 16, 1157-1158. This
section of Art. 42 is now repealed by MD. LAws 1958, Ch. 45, §1, making
the Act the sole route for appeals.
1, Unfortunately, there are no statistics regarding how many persons have
been released from incarceration by appellate action since 1945. However,
former Chief Judge Markell says:
"The great majority of the 200 cases disposed of by the Court of
Appeals [from 1945-1953] have been disposed of on the ground that
habeas corpus cannot be used as an appeal or new trial. * * * Most
of these cases have little basis except the applicant's dissatisfaction
with his confinement. They are prosecuted without counsel and prob-
ably would not be undertaken by any lawyer." Supra, n. 16, 1160.
Frederick W. Invernizzi, Director, Administrative Office of the Courts,
summarizes the more recent statistics as follows:
"The six years prior to 1956 saw 203 applications filed, of which
20 were unreported, three were granted, and 180 denied, necessitating
a total of 176 opinions, an average of six opinions per judge. Then
came the deluge, with 82 applications filed during the October 1956
term of court which, when coupled with thirteen advanced from the
succeeding term, required the writing of 86 opinions, more than
doubling the average number per judge. This, however, proved to be
but a preclude of what was to come, as there were 128 such applica-
tions filed during the September 1957 term of court. Disposition of
these cases required the writing of 104 opinions." Administrative
Ofice of the Courts, Third Annual Report (1958) 20.
'O This leaves the writ available to persons who do not come within the
scope of the Act. See discussion, supra, n. 8. Furthermore this satisfies
a constitutional objection that might be raised by those who are within
the scope of the Act. MD. CONsT. Art. III, §55, provides: "The General
Assembly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus." The writ under Art. 42, without a right of appeal, satis-
fies the Constitution and is left in full force. Cf. Olewiler v. Brady, 185
Md. 341, 44 A. 2d 807 (1945).
21The Act, §645 B(a). It appears that if the applicant does not evoke
the Act directly, whether he is entitled to the alternative procedure pro-
vided thereby is within the discretion of the Court and not as of right.
-
2 The Act, §645 B(b).
"The Act, §§645 B(b), 645 C, 645 G. If the imprisonment results from
a conviction by a trial magistrate the hearing court is the Circuit Court
of the county where the conviction took place; or if the Baltimore City,
the Criminal Court of Baltimore. For reasons of judicial -and adminis-
trative convenience, venue is laid at the place of conviction and not that
of incarceration or willy-nilly as under 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 42, §§1-3,
applying to writs of habeas corpus not under the Act. The court of con-
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consent, the petition is heard as a habeas corpus applica-
tion in the court where it was filed,24 and if heard and
denied, there is no longer any right to request leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeals from such denial.2" On the
other hand, in proceedings under the Act, any person
aggrieved by the order of a judge may apply to the Court
of Appeals for leave to prosecute an appeal.20
Any post conviction remedy other than the writ of
habeas corpus should be brought under the Act.27 A de-
fective delinquent can, if he desires, bring his existing
habeas corpus proceeding as such or under the Act. 8
A petition for relief under the Act may be filed at any
time; there are no limitations. 9 Once the aim of the Act
is appreciated, the formal requirements of the petition
speak for themselves. (1) The Act requires that hearings
of petitions take place in the court of conviction. There-
fore, except in a common law habeas corpus proceeding,
a petition must be filed in the court of conviction and must
specifically identify the judgment complained of.5" (2)
The Act attempts to bar frivolous claims for relief. Conse-
quently, all facts within the personal knowledge of peti-
tioner and the authenticity of all documents must be sworn
to affirmatively.5 (3) The act intends to discourage repe-
tition of the same claim by the petitioner. Therefore peti-
tioner must specifically set forth the grounds for his peti-
tion and the relief desired. The petition shall also identify
any previous proceedings that the petitioner has taken to
secure relief from his conviction.32
viction will be better able to determine the validity of petitioner's claims
and will have a record of petitioner's past claims for relief under the Act.
This provision may cause difficulty in those lower courts In counties which
have only one judge, since §645 -G disqualifies the judge who convicted the
applicant, unless the applicant consents.
"The Act, §645 B(b).
2MD. LAWS 1958, Ch. 45, §1, repealing 4 MD. CODa (1957) Art. 42, §6.
'*The Act, §645-I. "Any person" Includes the Attorney General of
Maryland or the State's Attorney. It should be noted that if 'the applicant
adopts the common law habeas corpus procedure under Art. 42, and Is
successful, the State no longer has a right of appeal. Supra, n. 25.
"The Act, §645 C. See comment, supra, n. 5.
"The Act, §645 A(a), expressly includes defective delinquents. 3 MD.
Conn (1957) Art. 31 B, §10(c), gives such persons the "... right to petition
for habeas corpus as It might otherwise exist."
"The Act, §645 A(b).
0The Act, § §645 C, 645 D. If a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
filed in a place other than the court of conviction and the petition is
treated In the alternative under the Act, the papers will be transmitted
to the court of conviction, §645 B(b).
mThe Act, §§645 C, 645 D. §645 D also states that arguments, citations,
and discussions of authorities shall be omitted from the petition. §645 F
provides that after the State's answer, no further pleadings shall be filed
except as the court may order.
The Act, '§645 D.
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Perhaps the most effective provisions of the Act will
be those regarding waiver. The first section of the Act
denies relief if the alleged error has:
"... been previously and finally litigated or waived in
the proceedings resulting in the conviction, or in any
other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to se-
cure relief from his conviction.""
The Court of Appeals in the first case arising under the
Act has indicated that this language is broad enough to
include determinations in prior habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 4 It is not clear that the same result will obtain in
the future in cases where the prior determination was not
subject to appeal. In the above quoted portion of the Act,
the phrase, "in any other proceeding" is qualified by the
language, "finally litigated or waived". Since there is no
longer a right of appeal available in those habeas corpus
proceedings which are not brought under the Act, it would
seem that the question of the finality of orders in such
proceedings should be determined by the law prior to 1945.
In Ex Parte Berman, in 1936, Judge Chesnut said:
"The Maryland practice provides for issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus by any of the State Judges but
does not provide an appeal from their decisions. The
refusal of the writ in one case is not regarded as res
adjudicata."15
On the other hand, adopting this reasoning, a habeas corpus
order under the Act would be a final judgment. Indeed,
the Act expressly states the effect of any prior proceeding
under the Act upon a subsequent attempt:
"All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner un-
der this sub-title must be raised in his original or
amended petition, and any grounds not so raised are
waived unless the court finds in a subsequent petition
"The Act, § 645 A(a). (Emphasis added.)
Byrd v. Warden, of the Maryland Penitentiary, 147 A. 2d 701, 702-3
(Md. 1959). In this case petitioner had taken several habeas corpus
cases to the Court of Appeals. There is no question that the prior appellate
judgments were regarded as final.
14 F. Supp. 716, 717 (D. Md. 1936). Cf. State ex rel Eyer v. Warden,
190 Md. 767, 772, 59 A. 2d 745 (1948), cert. den. 335 U.S. 804 (1948);
Coston v. Coston, 25 Md. 500 (1866). It is arguable that the Act itself
supports this view. By §645 B (b) an application for the common law writ
of habeas corpus cannot be treated as a proceeding under the Act unless
petitioner consents. It is difficult to see what right of the petitioner is
thus being protected unless it be immunity from the waiver provisions of
the Act.
[VOL. XIX
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT
grounds for relief asserted therein which could not
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended
petition."36
Furthermore, the Act provides that a lower court order
under the Act constitutes a final judgment for the purposes
of review. 7
The Act, as amended, provides that a subsequent post
conviction hearing will be granted only if the court which
is petitioned finds a hearing necessary. If the court finds
from the subsequent petition and the State's answer that
there are no new grounds for relief or that the grounds
relied upon have been waived, it may dismiss the subse-
quent petition without a hearing."
From the standpoint of waiver, the Act's retention of
the common law habeas corpus proceeding, without a right
of appeal, may be a trap for the unwary. 9 Laymen, un-
skilled in the law and not represented by counsel, cannot
be expected to fully appreciate the consequences of the
Act's waiver provisions. The Act therefore gives the hear-
ing court broad discretion to allow amendment or com-
plete withdrawal of petitions at any time prior to entry
of judgment."' Furthermore, if the court is satisfied as to
the truth of a petitioner's allegation of inability to pay
costs and employ counsel, the Act provides that the court
shall appoint counsel.41  However, under the Act as
amended, counsel must be appointed only for petitioner's
first petition. If on second or later petitions the court finds
that all grounds for relief have previously been asserted
or waived, no counsel need be appointed.42 This distinction
The Act, §645 H. (Emphasis added). This section Indicates that waiver
applies only to previous proceedings under the Act. See infra, n. 40.
The Act, §645 G.
The Act, §645 H.
89 Though the present writer disagrees, the language of Byrd v. Warden
of the Maryland Penitentiary, 147 A. 2d 701 (Md. 1959) which relies on
the broad language of §645 A(a), indicates that a petitioner who in the
future chooses the common law habeas corpus route and receives an ad-
verse lower court determination would be barred from later urging the
same grounds in a proceeding under the Act and thus could never obtain
appellate review of the validity of those grounds for relief previously
asserted in the common law proceeding. Furthermore, a rigorous applica-
tion of the waiver rule is justifiable only where petitioner has, in fact,
knowledge of the law either personally or from counsel.
'
0 The Act, §645 F.
'
1 The Act, §645 E.
12 The Act, §645 H. This section, as amended, is apparently the legis-
lature's response to the Byrd case, supra, n. 39, and Hobbs v. Warden of
Maryland Penitentiary, 148 A. 2d 380 (Md. 1959) which held that under
the Act as originally enacted an indigent petitioner who filed a petition
was entitled to a hearing and appointment of counsel even though the
1959]
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is sound; in the ordinary case under the Act an indigent
petitioner gets one paid in full proceeding, if necessary,
all the way to the Court of Appeals, but no more.43
The Act does not state whether, if a hearing is neces-
sary, the petitioner has a right to appear at the hearing.
This will depend upon whether the Court of Appeals char-
acterizes the proceedings under the Act as criminal or
civil.",
A beneficial innovation found in the Act is the express
requirement that the lower court order making final dis-
position of the petition shall clearly state the grounds on
which the case was determined and whether a federal or
a state right was presented and decided.45 One advantage
of requiring such a record is that it clearly determines
exhaustion of State remedy for the purpose of obtaining
access to the Federal courts.4"
The appeal procedure under the Act, instituted by re-
questing leave to prosecute an appeal within 30 days after
the final lower court order, is essentially the same as for-
merly available in habeas corpus cases.4 7
The Act in essence simplifies post conviction procedure
and in the ordinary case allows but one appeal to the Court
of Appeals. Unfortunately, it does not, and cannot, com-
pletely solve the problem of appeals from frivolous second
proceedings which inevitably arises once any appeals from
post conviction hearings are allowed. For example, a pris-
oner who has completely raised or waived all his possible
grounds for relief in previous post conviction proceedings,
whether under the Act or not, files a subsequent petition
under the Act; the lower court properly denies relief on
petitioned court decided that all the grounds for relief asserted had been
previously unsuccessfully raised In habeas corpus proceedings. Appointment
of counsel is still mandatory in the case of an original petition.
"However, if in a subsequent petition facts were alleged showing that
petitioner could not have reasonably raised a certain ground for relief,
petitioner would be entitled to paid counsel. The Act, §645 H.
If the Court of Appeals grants leave to appeal and also finds the peti-
tioner unable to pay the costs of the review, all necessary costs, including
court coste, stenographic services, and printing shall be paid by the
political subdivision in which the judgment is rendered. The Act, §645 E.
44 Cf. Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 44 A. 2d 807 (1945). 9B UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED (1957) 357, §7, comment, states that the prisoner need
not be brought before the court for the hearing. The language of the
Maryland Act, §645 G, is, "The court may order the petitioner brought
before it for the hearing." (Emphasis added).
"The Act, §645 G. It should be noted that this section expressly pro-
vides that the lower court order "... constitutes a final judgment for the
purposes of review."
"See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
47The Act, §645-I. MD. RULES 811 a, 816 b, 830 a 1, 291 b 1, 893. MD. LAWS
1958, Ch. 45, §1, repeals 4 Mo. CODE (1957) Art. 42, §6, which formerly
provided for appeals by persons entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.
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grounds of prior determination and waiver; nevertheless
the persistent petitioner files a request with the Court of
Appeals for leave to prosecute an appeal. The Court of
Appeals still must act on this request.4" Fortunately how-
ever, the provisions of the Act require a record which will
enable the Court of Appeals to quickly dispose of such
frivolous appeals.49 It is clear that in view of the provi-
sions of the Act and its obvious intent, a person seeking
relief under the Act would be well advised to carefully,
with the aid of counsel, marshal any and all grounds for
relief in his original petition.
The Legislature of this State by allowing appeals in
post conviction cases, has chosen to provide persons greater
safeguards of their liberty than are constitutionally re-
quired. To borrow from former Chief Judge Markell's
reference to the Act of 1945 which first granted appeals
in habeas corpus cases, the result of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act will be ". . . to put an end to long-standing
abuse of the writ and to preserve the writ for its historic
objects as a bulwark of liberty.""0
JOHN D. ALEXANDER, JR.
STRIKE BENEFITS - INCOME OR GIFTS?
Kaiser v. United States1
Plaintiff, an employee of the Kohler Company in Wis-
consin, on April 5, 1954, with other employees, went on
strike. At that time he was not a member of the Interna-
tional Union or the local affiliate at Kohler. During the
strike he did not receive benefits in cash, but in May, 1954,
he began to receive from the Union maintenance assistance
in the form of food, clothing and payments for rent on his
house. The Union determined the needs of the employees
by a questionnaire. On April 15, 1955, plaintiff filed his
income tax return and claimed a refund since the amount
,1 See discussion, 8upra, n. 18, and related text.
"See Maryland Rule 826 b, requiring the record to consist of the
original papers. Thus a glance at the subsequent petition will show the
true situation.
Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and
by Appeal, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1162-1163 (1953).
1262 F. 2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. gr., # 858, 6/2/59. The Internal
Revenue Service announced that pending review of the Kaiser case, it will
continue to follow its position that strike benefits are taxable. Technical
Information Release No. 148, March 25, 1959. 596 CCH Stand. Federal Tax
Reports, 6410.
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